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We show that academics with experience in government jobs generate spillovers for their early 
career colleagues. Our template is the National Science Foundation rotation program in which 
the agency employs academics, called rotators, on loan from their university. Shortly after the 
rotator’s return from the agency, fresh assistant professors in her department double their 
research resources and are more likely to win small and medium size grants compared to 
academics in three control groups. Consistent with evidence that the mechanism is mentoring 
from the rotator, the results suggest that access to individuals with insights gained outside 
academia propels scientific careers. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Access to superior human capital generates improvements in productivity via knowledge 
spillovers (Schultz 1961, Zucker, Darby, and Brewer 1998). Indeed, in academia, one of the most 
knowledge intensive sectors, a major source of productivity is access to scientists with insights 
acquired through successful experience within it (Waldinger 2010, Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and 
Wang 2010, Brogaard, Engelberg, and Parsons 2014, Borjas and Doran 2015a, Colussi 2018). 
We report novel evidence that highlights an alternative route—positive spillovers also result 
from access to academics with insights gained because of their temporary experience in 
government jobs. An example of such academics is Steven Chu, Professor of Physics at the 
University of California, Berkeley, who served as the Secretary of Energy from 2009 until mid-
2013 before returning to his academic home. Among other benefits, these employment spells 
infuse academics with insider knowledge on the allocation of resources by the government, the 
main funder of research endeavors. This knowledge can prove valuable when transmitted to 
colleagues seeking ways to boost their research capabilities and advance science.  
 To study the impact of temporary employment in government, we explore the link 
between research fund acquisition of early career scientists and exposure of these scientists to 
rotators—academics who are seconded to the National Science Foundation (NSF) for typically 
two years before they return to their respective academic institutions. During their tenure at the 
NSF, rotators, formally designated as Program Directors, organize and run the peer review 
process from the beginning until the end while often exercising decision-making power. They 
become insiders at the NSF as they gain insights on the process of funding decisions, possess 
tacit knowledge on the potential funding directions and priorities of the agency, and ultimately 
gain the ability to discern a promising proposal.  
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 We ask three questions. One, do rotators influence the funding records of their early 
career colleagues (and if so, what is the mechanism)? Two, for how long does the effect last? 
Three, what type of change do rotators bring about: a “go big” (larger grants) approach or a “go-
safe” approach (small and medium size grants)?  
We find evidence that rotators act as mentors. They leverage their insider knowledge to 
communicate to their early career colleagues what to write in and how to write a proposal and 
where to send a proposal. As a result, rotators have a causal impact on the funding acquisition 
records of new hires landing their first faculty position in their department. We find that newly 
hired assistant professors in departments with a returning rotator raise almost twice the NSF 
amount when compared to the amount raised by similar academics in similar departments 
without a rotator (research question 1). This gain amounts to approximately $200,000 more, 
which is nearly half of the average first time grant acquired from the NSF. The effect decays 
with time (research question 2) as we observe significant changes in resource acquisition within 
two years after the return of the rotator from the NSF and a decline afterwards. Rotators promote 
a “go-safe” approach (research question 3): the probability of winning small and medium size 
(but not large) grant is significantly higher for academics who interact with a rotator when 
compared to similar others.  
Our work makes three main contributions. One, we add to the scarce literature on 
academic mentoring which has shown that institutionalized forms of mentorship such as 
postdoctoral fellowships matter (Heggeness et al. 2018, Blau et al. 2010). We demonstrate that 
informal, likely less resource demanding and more widely accessible, forms of mentoring 
exemplified by the relationship between rotators and early career scientists pay off too. Two, we 
contribute to the literature on research fund acquisition which has not zoomed in on early career 
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scientists by switching the focus to them (Feinberg and Price 2004, Arora and Gambardella 
2005, Li 2017, Grimpe 2012). This is an important change because assessing how early career 
scientists can gain access to resources is a first order concern (Alberts et al. 2014) and allows us 
to better understand the sources of individual long term productivity and scientific progress 
overall (Alberts et al. 2014, Rosenbloom et al. 2015, Ganguli 2017, Oyer 2006, Petersen et al. 
2011, Bol, de Vaan, and van de Rijt 2018, Lerchenmueller and Sorenson 2018). Three, our work 
pushes the emerging literature on the effects of experience outside academia using the rotation 
program as its template to new directions. Kolympiris, Hoenen, and Klein (2018) used a different 
dataset to set up a two period difference-in-difference setting to establish that rotators can serve 
as effective knowledge conduits for same department peers who are similar, in terms of research 
topic and tenure, to the rotator. Here, we break new ground by bringing to light three novel 
insights.  
One, by comparing our results with the findings of Kolympiris, Hoenen, and Klein (2018) 
we discover that spillovers from access to superior human capital gained because of experience 
outside academia are not uniform across colleagues. Rotators have an effect on junior scientists, 
those for whom getting grants is most important, which is considerably larger than their effect on 
senior scientists. This finding is relevant because it reveals that access to insights gained inside 
and outside academia share commonalities and have differences. The main similarity is that not 
everyone gains equally from access to high human capital. Aligned with Waldinger (2016, 2010, 
2012) who demonstrated that access to high human capital from experience within academia 
matters for junior scientists, has no effect for department peers and a moderate effect for 
attracting new hires we discover that rotators benefit their early career colleagues substantially 
more than they benefit their senior colleagues. The main difference is that only access to high 
4 
 
human capital from insights outside academia translates to gain from same department 
colleagues: in contrast to Waldinger (2012) and Borjas and Doran (2012) who found no and 
negative effects for same department peers respectively, we document positive effects for same 
department peers.  
Two, our novel focus on the long run or year to-to-year effects of knowledge transfer 
from rotators allows to unravel, for the first time, the sort of knowledge that is required in order 
to generate changes in resource acquisition. We find that recent insights gained via short tenure 
at continuously evolving funding organizations such as the NSF are more effective than general 
intuition about grant allocation. This finding has implications, among others, for the academic 
labor market as it advises candidates which job offer and when to accept. 
Three, the focus on the types of grants that rotators push their junior colleagues to pursue 
offers a fresh understanding of what established knowledgeable academics recognize as the best 
way forward for scientists at their formative stages of their career. This finding has broad 
implications for the direction of science and what it means for mentoring to promote the “go 
safe” option. 
For our identification strategy, we compare the funding records of new hires landing their 
first faculty post in departments with and without a rotator—the former belonging to our 
treatment group and the rest belonging to our control group(s). The major empirical challenge in 
this exercise is that superior human capital is not distributed randomly. Instead, endogenous 
sorting places individuals with high human capital next to each other (Kim, Morse, and Zingales 
2009, Waldinger 2016). Within our framework, this would imply that the colleagues of rotators 
are more equipped than others in raising research funds. To circumvent this sorting issue, we 
exploit two features of the rotation program and carefully construct three control groups. The 
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first feature is that the (timing of) entry into rotation is independent of the needs of the 
colleagues to raise funds. Academics become rotators because they want to learn more about the 
NSF, not because they recognize emerging colleagues who need advice. The second feature is 
that the return to the home institution is also exogenous to the needs of colleagues to raise funds. 
The rotation duties have a fixed end date. As a result, rotators do not return to their institutions 
because (or when) their colleagues need help. These two features of the program suggest that the 
allocation of early stage academics to the treatment and control group is largely exogenous to 
their choice of employer. However, three different sources of endogeneity may still allocate 
individuals to treatment and control groups non-randomly, which would constitute a threat to 
identification. We discuss these sources and focus on how we address in the subsequent section. 
First, initial job placement can be endogenous to job candidates’ choice to accept an offer 
from a department with a rotator because of the rotator’s presence in that department and the 
associated ex-ante expectation of mentoring how to raise research funds. Along the same lines, 
labor market conditions differ across years and can have a strong impact on which job candidate 
lands where. We tackle these issues by exploiting time variation: we construct our first dataset 
including new hires joining the same department at different points in time when labor market 
conditions vary, the focal colleague had or not left for the NSF and had or not the rotation 
experience. 
Second, if the academic labor market works efficiently, then the best candidates will land 
in the best positions and the lesser candidates will land in lesser positions (Cole and Cole 1973). 
If this holds true, then the success in raising funds may be explained by this matching process 
with rotators belonging to the better departments. Similarly, difficult to capture heterogeneity 
among PhD holders may also explain initial job placements. We tackle these issues by crafting a 
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second dataset comprising PhD holders (some landing a job in a department with a rotator and 
others acquiring a job in a department without a rotator), who had the same PhD advisor, worked 
in the same science field, and graduated about in the same year (Kahn and MacGarvie 2016). 
Given that advisor standing and graduating institution are the prime determinants of initial job 
placements (Miller, Click, and Cardinal 2005, Terviö 2011), it is expected that, as shown in 
Tables 2 and 3 below, new hires from the same advisor land their first faculty post in 
departments whose main difference is the presence of a rotator as they are generally of 
comparable status, academic productivity and research fund acquisition records. Importantly, 
because the selection into advisors is not random (Waldinger 2010) and PhD training is largely 
standardized within doctoral programs (hence both the selection and treatment are nearly 
identical), these new hires are also similar to each other at the time of their first academic 
appointment in terms of age, gender, measured innate ability, and other similar qualities. 
Third, university-wide policies, tenure-track incentives, grant-writing support, and other 
university-specific factors may boost incentives to become a rotator, shape the types of emerging 
scientists who decide to join a given university, and ultimately explain the increase in grant 
acquisition rates. This may lead to erroneous conclusions about the impact of rotators if they are 
disproportionally employed at institutions that for the aforementioned reasons are more 
successful in research funding acquisitions than in others. We tackle this issue by constructing 
our third dataset. This dataset holds university-wide factors constant and allows the comparison 
of funding records of new hires who joined the same university at approximately the same time 
but in different, yet comparable, departments having one main difference: some have a rotator as 
a faculty member and some do not.  
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Despite the careful construction of the datasets to match new hires in the treatment and 
control departments, remaining differences in training, ambitions, and career goals, among 
others, may still exist. We include several control variables in the analysis to account for such 
factors. Further, we perform a battery of exercises that reinforce the stability of our estimates and 
allow us to pinpoint with precision the mechanism driving the estimates.  
II. The rotation program at the NSF and how rotators can induce changes in 
grant acquisition 
 
The NSF has an annual budget that exceeds $7.5 billion and funds approximately 12,000 
proposals annually in all non-medical scientific fields. These proposals support more than 
360,000 scientists, teachers, and students employed at close to 2,000 institutions (NSF 2017). 
The agency is structured hierarchically; its seven directorates, corresponding to different 
scientific fields, are split into divisions that are further subdivided into programs. The program 
directors (PDs) are subject matter experts who run each program. They put together the review 
panels, communicate, ex-ante and ex-post, with submitters of funded and rejected proposals, 
review proposals even from programs and directorates outside their own, make grant allocation 
decisions, participate in panels outside their programs, and provide inputs to central strategic 
planning not only within their program but also across programs and directorates (Li and 
Marrongelle 2013). Overall, PDs are an integral part of the NSF and are key to shaping the 
direction of science. 
 Most PDs are permanent NSF employees. However, since the passage of the 
Intergovernmental Personnel Act in 1970, roughly 1 out of 3 PDs are academics who are posted 
at the NSF temporarily (Mervis 2016). These academics, called rotators, infuse the agency with 
new viewpoints as they move to the NSF headquarters. These rotators, on loan from their 
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university, work full time for the NSF for up to 4 years (most commonly 2) and effectively stall 
their academic duties during their tenure at the NSF (Mervis 2013). From 2004 to 2014 alone, 
800 rotators from around 400 academic institutions served at the NSF. Rotators are subject to 
strict restrictions during and even after their tenure at the NSF to avoid any conflicts of interest 
or favoritism (e.g., they cannot submit proposals or evaluate proposals of previous collaborators). 
As revealed during a handful of discussions with former rotators, the main reason 
academics enter the program is attributed to a desire to acquire an in-depth understanding about 
the NSF and to generally contribute to the field of science.1 These drivers explain why we do not 
identify specific trends among rotators; besides the fact that all had won grants from the agency 
in the past, they are employed at universities of varying size, status, and location. Additionally, 
they vary in terms of scholarly productivity, leadership activities, and methodological 
approaches in their research, among others. As mentioned above, the fact that the decision of 
rotators to join the rotation program is exogenous to the need of colleagues for help in raising 
funds alleviates the concerns of endogeneity; these endogeneity concerns arise from the former’s 
potential entry into the NSF as a deliberate response to the latter’s need for mentoring to raise 
funds. 
 During their tenure at the NSF, rotators become insiders at the agency; they evaluate 
numerous proposals, observe others performing similar tasks, and gain hands-on knowledge of 
the largely unobserved factors that shape panel decision making (Bagues, Sylos-Labini, and 
Zinovyeva 2017); additionally, they become aware of the following: a) what the NSF prioritizes 
and b) the areas where the demand for promising proposals exceeds the supply. We expect these 
                                                     
1 The blog entry of Dan Cosley, Associate Professor at the Cornell University, about his rotation 
experience serves as a good example of why academics choose to work at the NSF and the types of 
insights they gain (http://blogs.cornell.edu/danco/2016/09/09/why-im-rotating-at-nsf/ )  
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unique insights to enable rotators to recognize a competitive proposal. In turn, because 
knowledge sharing is stronger among individuals of the same group (department, in our 
application) (Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo 2009), this insider knowledge can spillover to rotators’ 
colleagues and create an advantage for them in that they gain knowledge that their counterparts 
lack. In fact, evidence on the effects of rotators on later stage academics without NSF grants ex-
ante supports this expectation (Kolympiris, Hoenen, and Klein 2018).  
Specifically, for early career scientists, having access to an insider can be instrumental as 
rotators can act as informal mentors. Evidence on formal forms of mentoring (e.g. post-doctoral 
fellowships) suggests that it pays off (Blau et al. 2010, Heggeness et al. 2018) and indeed fund 
raising comes up regularly in academic mentoring (Feldman et al. 2010). Specifically, rotators 
can mentor their early career colleagues on three main fronts in securing grants. First, rotators 
can direct colleagues to research areas the NSF prioritizes that are otherwise difficult to detect. In 
other words, they can provide suggestions on what the agency is keen to fund. Second, because 
grant writing is typically not the focus of doctoral training, rotators can fill the gap and assist 
their colleagues to present ideas effectively and, generally, craft proposals in ways that 
communicate the research insights in an appealing manner. The sheer number of proposals that 
the NSF receives makes communication and framing proposal vital to allowing externals reviews 
and, subsequently, to enabling panel members to appreciate the merits of a given proposal in a 
better manner. Third, rotators can address the main obstacle concerned with the initiation of the 
proposal—idea generation (Custer, Loepp, and Martin 2000). Since rotators possess tacit 
knowledge on research themes that are more likely to receive funding, they can guide their early 
career colleagues on research questions they can pursue. Indeed, as we explain in section VI, we 
find evidence that rotators influence the direction of research for their early stage colleagues. 
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III. Data Sources and Empirical Approach 
 
A. The Treatment Group 
 
To construct the datasets that trace, over time, the NSF grant acquisition record of new hires in 
departments with and without a rotator, we collect and merge new data from multiple sources. 
We accessed the list of 240 academics who served as rotators at the NSF under the 
Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) from 2009 to 2011 via a Freedom of Information (FOI) 
request directed to the NSF.2 Following existing works relying on online data retrieval for 
academics (Terviö 2011, Amir and Knauff 2008, Kim, Morse, and Zingales 2009), we visited 
current and archived university websites from https://archive.org/ and combined this search with 
the career information retrieved from the Men and Women of Science database to identify 
faculty members who, as their first faculty position, were hired as assistant professors before, 
after, and during the year of the rotator’s return to the department. We were able to build 
comprehensive and detailed career histories for 80 rotators. Subsequently, we examined the 
professional history of more than 3,200 seasoned and early stage academics belonging to these 
80 departments with a rotator; of these 3,200 academics, we identified 210 academics with a 
comprehensive career history, who as their first faculty post joined 64 departments with a rotator 
between five years before and two years after the rotator returned from the NSF. As shown in 
Appendix Table 1, the 64 rotators in the focal departments are representative of the population of 
                                                     
2 As detailed in the next section, we track grant acquisition 5 years before the departure of the rotator and 
5 years after the rotator’s return. As such, we focus on academics who served at the NSF between 2009 
and 2011 mainly because the start of the ex-ante period (2004) is recent enough to source comprehensive 
data from online sources and the end of the ex-post period (2016) allows us to observe the ex-post period 
in its entirety. Along the same lines, our focus on early career academics allows us to collect and organize 
online data with increased accuracy as scientists of this cohort are generally prompt in keeping their 
online profiles updated.  
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rotators. The 210 academics in the 64 departments with a rotator comprise the treatment group, 
and the indicators of a treatment effect by a rotator (discussed below) assume positive values as 
they all overlap with the rotator for at least one year after the rotator’s return from the NSF.  
We identify the following three cohorts within the 210 academics in the treatment group: 
a) 55 academics who joined when (or shortly after) the rotator returned from the NSF, b) 66 
academics who joined when the rotator was at the NSF, and c) 89 academics who joined within 
two to five years before the rotator had left for the NSF. The formulation of three cohorts helps 
us to surmount endogeneity and sample selection concerns. It helps us with endogeneity because 
from these cohorts we can eliminate nearly with absolute certainty the possibility that the new 
hires chose to join the department expecting to learn from a returning rotator for cohort (c): the 
academics who joined the department before the given scientist left for the NSF. With regards to 
sample selection, the rotation experience may correlate with an increased ability to select job 
candidates with higher chances of attracting research grants. If this was true, and if rotators 
participated in selection committees, then the treatment groups would have been populated with 
new hires who, ex-ante, were better equipped to win grants. However, the issue cannot hold for 
cohort (b)—academics who joined when the returning rotator was at the NSF—and it is less 
likely to hold for cohort (a)—academics who joined at the time of the rotator’s return from the 
NSF. Essentially, these two cohorts allow us to address the potential for sample selection at 
hand.3  
B. The First Control Group 
 
                                                     
3 A threat to identification would be when rotation improves the selection criteria and allows rotators to 
give informal advice on the selection of candidates during their tenure at the NSF or during their short 
visits to their institutions. If this holds true, then the new hires around the time of rotation and rotator’s 
return from the NSF would be different from other candidates. However, this is contrary to our 
observations. 
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The first control group allows us to hold department effects fixed and is composed of 25 
academics belonging to 14 departments; these academics joined a department with a rotator, but 
their tenure at the department did not overlap with the tenure of the rotator. The absence of 
overlap may be either because these academics left the respective departments before the rotator 
returned from the NSF or, in a few cases, because the rotator moved to a new university at the 
end of her tenure at the NSF.4  
C. The Second Control Group 
 
The second control group addresses individual heterogeneity. Using data from the ProQuest 
dissertations and theses database, we identified the PhD advisor of the new hires in departments 
with a rotator and the remaining PhD students whom she/he supervised as the main advisor and 
who graduated in the same year as that of, two years before, and two years after the focal new 
hire. We focus on same-advisor graduates because of the following reasons: a) initial job 
placement is largely explained by the advisor’s network and standing in the profession and the 
graduating department (Long 1978, Terviö 2011), b) selection into advisors is not random 
(Waldinger 2010), and c) doctoral training is largely standardized among PhD candidates of the 
same cohort. It follows that because graduates of the same advisor are similar both in the 
selection (into an advisor) phase and in the PhD training/treatment phase, we expect this exercise 
to allow us to account for individual specific factors that can influence grant acquisition. 
                                                     
4 The small size of the first control group is consistent with the tenure track system in the US where (in) 
voluntary departures from a given department are uncommon before the end of the tenure clock. 15 of the 
25 academics in the 1st control group did not overlap with the rotator because they left the department and 
10 did not overlap with the rotator because once the rotator’s tenure at the NSF was over she moved to a 
different university. If bad fit with the department prompted these 15 academics or the rotator to change 
institution, the control group could be less comparable to the treatment group and this could plague our 
estimates. We do not find evidence of such possibility: When we omit from the analysis, sequentially, 
academics who did not overlap with the rotator because they changed university or because the rotator 
changed university, we find qualitatively similar results to the baseline estimates.  
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Specifically, starting with the 210 academics in the treatment group, we construct the 
professional history of nearly 600 PhD graduates who had the same PhD advisor and graduated 
within two years of the focal academic’s graduation year. By eliminating academics who left 
academia, never landed an assistant professor position in the US, accepted an academic position 
outside the US, or did not have a professional history online (CV and LinkedIn, among others), 
we populate our second control group with 105 same-advisor academics who landed their first 
faculty position in 100 different US departments without a rotator. 
D. The Third Control Group 
 
The third control group accounts for university-specific initiatives that can promote entry into 
administrative roles outside the university, grant funding sessions and tenure track criteria that 
can explain differences in raising funds across different institutions. Retrieving data from 
university websites and the Men and Women of Science database, we populate the third control 
group with academics who started their first faculty position as assistant professors at the 
rotator’s university, but in a different, yet comparable, department the same year, two years 
before, and two years after the rotator returned from the NSF. We find similar departments by 
employing the following criteria. First, the department must belong to the same larger division or 
school as the department with a rotator. For instance, when the department of the rotator is an 
Engineering department, we limit the search to other departments in the School of Engineering. 
Second, the control department must be in an intellectual space that is adjacent to the department 
with a rotator. Adhering to the previous criterion, when the treatment department is Industrial 
Engineering, we choose the department of Civil Engineering within the School of Engineering 
and not, for instance, the department of Chemical Engineering. Typically, the title of the 
department serves as a sufficient tool to identify similar departments. When not, we choose 
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departments whose faculty members publish in the same journals as the faculty members of the 
rotator departments. Third, we select a comparable department that hired an assistant professor 
during the timeframe of our study. These selection criteria yielded 60 academics from 24 
departments of the same university that had departments with rotators who were hired into their 
first position anytime between two years before and two years after the focal academic joined the 
focal department.5  
Subsequent to the finalization of the list of names belonging to the treatment and the three 
control groups, we extracted data from the abovementioned sources, the bibliographic database 
SCOPUS, and the NSF grant retrieval website to build a full career history for the focal 
academics. Leveraging on the career history of the academics, we construct variables that 
describe the NSF acquisition records, tenure at the institution, research productivity, and annual 
academic position, among others. Appendix Table 2 provides an elaborate description of the 
sources of data and the associated variables. 
E. Baseline Estimation Setup 
 
We employ an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator wherein the dependent variable is the 
inflation-adjusted amount of research funds raised from the NSF in a given year by a given new 
hire who belongs to either a treatment or a control group (to address our third research question 
                                                     
5 As already discussed, we pose different research questions and focus on different cohorts of scientists 
when compared to the only other paper on rotators (Kolympiris, Hoenen, and Klein 2018). Empirically, 
this dictated separate research designs, different sets of methods and new samples and data. For example, 
the research design of the present work relies, to a large extent, on an exercise that allocates junior 
scientists in the control group if they have had the same advisor in the same period with those scientists 
who ended up in a department with a rotator. On the other side, the research design of Kolympiris, 
Hoenen, and Klein (2018) looks for faculty in similar departments in different universities of similar 
ranking (matching on same advisor did not seem appropriate for academics with extensive experience 
since the PhD).  As such, the datasets of the two papers do not intercept and there is no scientist present in 
both. 
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we build logistic models we explain below). These amounts reflect new grant(s), with the focal 
academic being the principal investigator, and not continuations or extensions of existing grants.  
Each observation is a person-year starting from the year the focal academic joined the 
given department as her first faculty post in an assistant professor position and ending up to five 
years after the return of the rotator to the department.6 On average, we track the yearly grant 
acquisition rate for each academic in the treatment group for 8.7 years (up to five of which are 
after the return from rotation) and for each academic in the three control groups for 7.7 years. 
Therefore, in line with the importance of early career academics raising research funds early on, 
we follow them the years leading to the tenure clock running out. To test whether rotators induce 
changes in the NSF grant acquisition record of their early career colleagues, we include variables 
that take the value of 1 when the focal academic is in the department of the rotator in the same 
year that the rotator returned from the NSF (Treatment 0), in the first year since the rotator 
returned from the NSF (Treatment 1), and, in a similar fashion, until the fifth year since the 
rotator returned from the NSF (Treatment 5).7 The person-year set-up and the associated 
Treatment 0 to 5 variables allow us to test the treatment effect of the rotators on their colleagues 
with precision (research question 1), and hence we can uncover the duration of the effect and its 
magnitude over time (research question 2).  
 We conduct the analysis on three different datasets. Each dataset includes the treatment 
group and the first, second, and third control group, respectively. 
F. Control Variables 
 
                                                     
6 Only 8 out of the 210 academics in the treatment group overlapped with the rotator after her return for 
less than 5 years. 
7 We use the 5-year window as it matches the typical application submission time during the common 6-
year tenure clock for most junior faculty.  
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As demonstrated through Tables 1 to 3 below, by and large, academics in the treatment and 
control groups are similar to each other and they belong to similar departments. These 
similarities suggest that any differences in the grant acquisition records between academics in 
treatment and control groups ex-post can be attributed to the rotator. However, additional 
differences may exist. Accordingly, we include several control variables in the analysis to 
account for such differences.  
 Difficult to quantify or observe factors at the department level may induce changes in 
fund acquisition in the future. These can include visiting faculty transmitting knowledge on fund 
acquisition or shocks such as increased teaching load at time t that can limit the capacity to 
submit research proposals at time t+1,2, 3, among others. We control for such effects by adding 
the variables Rotator Department -1 up to Rotator Department-5 in the analysis. The variables 
take the value of 1 when the person-year observations refer to academics who joined a 
department from which a rotator originated from one to five years before the rotator’s return 
from the NSF. To illustrate, if the person-year observations refer to academics who, for instance, 
joined the focal department two years before the return of the rotator, then the Rotator 
Department 1 and Rotator Department 2 would assume positive values, while Rotator 
Departments 3, 4, and 5 would assume the value of 0. To account for potential learning effects 
during post-graduate studies, we include the variable PostDoc that measures the number of years 
during which the focal new hire was employed in a post-doctoral position before assuming a 
faculty post. The variables Assistant Professor and Associate Professor denote experience and 
take the value of 1 for person-years during which the focal academic held an assistant professor 
and associate professor position, respectively, and 0 otherwise (the base category is Professor; 
this category is composed of 9 scientists who became professors within our time window). We 
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include the dummy variable Male for male academics to account for gender differences in grant 
acquisition. The time-varying variable H-index (lagged by one year) measures the H-5 citation 
index of the academic in question and controls for the influence of an academic’s existing track 
record on grant acquisition. The availability of research funds in previous years or from different 
sources may condition one’s NSF funding record in a given year. As such, we include the 
variable External Funding in the analysis that measures the funding amounts from sources other 
than the NSF; we also include the variable Previous NSF that measures the sum of NSF funding 
raised by the focal academic during the 5 years preceding the focal person-year observation.  
 Further, we incorporate explanatory variables that reflect potential influences from the 
host institution. We include the following: a) the time-varying variable (Ranking) that measures 
the ranking quartile of the focal university to account for potential status effects afforded to 
academics in higher-ranked universities and b) the time-varying Faculty NSF variable that 
measures the sum of NSF funds raised by existing faculty members in the rotator’s department 
before the rotator’s return from the NSF; this variable accounts for the learning on how to raise 
NSF funds from existing faculty members other than the rotator. Finally, we include the field of 
science and year-fixed effects to control a) for differences across the scientific fields in the 
propensity and need to raise funds from the NSF and b) for differences in funding cycles at the 
agency. In models reported in Online Appendix Table 1 we also include department and scientist 
fixed effects. The inclusion of these fixed effects consumes many degrees of freedom but the 
results are similar to the baseline estimates as presented in Table 5 below. 
G. Descriptive Statistics  
 
In this section, we provide evidence that our research design allows us to isolate the effect of the 
rotator; this isolation is possible because the academics who make up the treatment and control 
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groups are similar before the return of the rotator and start their assistant professor positions in 
similar departments. We also provide a description of the rotators and explain that the rotators 
employed for the analysis are representative of the population of rotators.  
 In Table 1, we present selected statistics for the academics in the treatment and the 3 
control groups. At the start of their faculty position, between 2003 and 2015 (2012 for those in 
the treatment group), academics in the four groups were similar in many respects including 
experience, gender distribution, publication records, and, importantly, previous funding from the 
NSF. For instance, 75 percent of the scientists in the treatment group had a first author 
publication before their graduation (as per the measure of innate ability by Kahn and MacGarvie 
(2016)), had an H-index of 1.92, and had raised, on average, $28,000 from the NSF as a principal 
investigator when they started their first faculty post. The average corresponding figures for the 
scientists in the 3 control groups were 70 percent, 2.17 and $27,000. Additionally, when the 
rotator was at the NSF, the funding records across scientists in the four groups were similar. 
Where we do observe a significant difference is on the total amount raised from the NSF in the 5 
years following the return of the rotator (and the equivalent period for those in control groups). 
Academics in the treatment groups raise, on average, close to $500,000, while academics in the 3 
control groups raise half of that amount, $250,000. 8As discussed in detail in the subsequent 
sections, if we attribute this difference to the rotator, then the effect would be substantial. The 
rotators are not only expected to double the amount that a given early career academic raises 
from the NSF, but they are also responsible for roughly half of the first major grant that an 
                                                     
8 As presented at the bottom of Table 1, the differences in ex-post acquisition are statistically different 
between the treatment group and the second and third control group. The first control group is small and 
this likely explains the lack of statistical significance despite the economically meaningful difference 
between the ex-post NSF acquisition of the academics in that group and the ex-post acquisition of 
academics in the treatment group.  
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emerging scientist raises from the agency; based on NSF data, we find that the average inflation-
adjusted NSF grant across directorates from 2006 to 2016 for first time principal investigators 
was $439,000.  
 But, what could explain the difference in funding records among academics in the 
treatment and control groups is heterogeneity in the universities and departments the sample 
scientists belong to. However, Tables 2 and 3 exhibit contrary findings. The departments with a 
rotator raised $1.1 million annually from the NSF during the period preceding the rotator’s return 
from the NSF (Table 2). The departments without a rotator raised $1.2 million in the equivalent 
period. The status and research productivity indicators in Table 3 paint a similar picture—55 
percent of the universities with a rotator are members of the prestigious Association of American 
Universities. The corresponding percentage for universities without a rotator is 50 percent. Along 
the same lines, 23 percent of the departments with a rotator are in the first quartile in the science 
field specific Shanghai ranking, while 26 percent of the departments without a rotator belong to 
the same quartile. Overall, we do not observe significant differences in terms of funding records 
and status/productivity indicators between the departments that are with and without a rotator.9  
 Table 4 describes the rotators in the sample. They are typically mid-career academics 
who have been successful in raising funds from the NSF and have varied publications and 
                                                     
9 Besides similarities in what we expect to be the most relevant dimensions in explaining grant acquisition 
at the department level as shown in Tables 2 and 3 (previous funding, status and research productivity), 
the treatment and control departments are comparable in more general terms too. For instance, the 
average department in the treatment group has 36 faculty members; 15 of them are full professors and 
then roughly an equal split of 9 at the assistant and the associate professor level respectively. The 
equivalent figures for the departments in control group 2 are 31, 14 and an equal split of 8. Similar figures 
also for departments in control group 3: average size of 38, 16 professors and an equal split between 
associate and assistant professors. Along the same lines, the universities of the treatment and control 
group 2 departments are comparable (control groups 1 and 3 are in the same universities with the 
treatment group). For instance, one out of 4.5 universities in the treatment group are private, was founded, 
on average, in 1873 and has 29,903 students. Universities of the departments in control group 2 are 
somewhat older (established in 1856), of similar size (29,732) and one out of 3.5 is private.   
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citation records. As shown in Appendix Table 1, the descriptive statistics of the rotators in the 
sample are similar to the descriptive statistics of the population of rotators who served at the 
NSF. 
---Tables 1 to 4 about here--- 
   
IV. Main Results 
 
 
Table 5 presents the baseline estimates. We cluster the standard errors at the department level. 
This choice is predicated on the finding that, as in our case, when the treatment is at the 
department level, but the unit of analysis is at the individual level, the estimation needs to 
employ a White/Huber heteroscedasticity correction for the standard errors (Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan 2004). As we find in unreported results, the inference remains nearly identical 
when we cluster the errors at the scientist level to account for the fact that each scientist enters 
the analysis more than once. 
In Model 1, we use the sample that includes the academics in the treatment group and the 
academics in the first control group. The coefficients of the Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 
variables (also plotted in Figure 1) suggest that rotators induce positive and economically 
meaningful changes in the funding acquisition of their early career colleagues. The Treatment 3 
coefficient is also statistically significant. However, we interpret such evidence as suggestive 
because the significance does not hold across specifications, both for the baseline estimates and 
for the selected robustness checks. Addressing our first research question, overlapping with the 
rotator one and two years after her return from the NSF leads to an increase in funding that 
exceeds $200,000. To put this in perspective, as shown in Table 1 above, academics in the 
treatment groups raise $500,000 during the 5 years following the return of the rotator, while in 
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the corresponding period academics in the control groups raise $251,000. At the same time, the 
average first time grant from the NSF across directorates is $439,000. As such, given the 
Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 estimates, it appears that the rotator treatment effect nearly doubles 
the fund acquisition record of early career scientists and is responsible for close to half of an 
academic’s first grant from the agency. As well, the $200,000 figure allows us to compare the 
effect of rotators on early career scientists with their effects on their established colleagues with 
limited fund acquisition in the past as measured in Kolympiris, Hoenen, and Klein (2018) who 
find that within a 5 year window since interaction with a rotator, established colleagues raise 
$138,000 more than similar others. This gain is $62,000 less than what early career colleagues 
gain due to a rotator or nearly half of the full gains realized by established colleagues. Finally, 
the fact that we find that rotators impact their same department peers implies that access to high 
human capital gained from experience within academia differs from access to high human capital 
gained from experience outside academia: Waldinger (2012) and Borjas and Doran (2012) found 
no and negative effects for same department peers respectively.     
Addressing our second research question, the gains from the rotator are stronger in the 
first two years of overlapping (when, roughly, the tenure track clock is about to run out) and do 
not extend beyond that time period. As we demonstrate in section VII, two main reasons 
underpin this findings. First, within the 5-year window, the increased workload following the 
award of a grant limits new grant application submissions in the subsequent years. Second, over 
a period, there is a decay in the value of the knowledge the rotator transmits to her colleagues as 
the agency evolves and changes priorities, among others.  
 In Model 2, we conduct the analysis using the academics on the treatment group and the 
academics in the second control group. Similar to the results in Model 1, the Treatment 1 and 
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Treatment 2 estimates indicate that indeed overlap with a rotator is beneficial to research 
funding, even after accounting for individual-specific heterogeneity. The reduced magnitude of 
the Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 coefficients in Model 2 when compared to the Model 1 
coefficients implies the significance of individual-specific factors for fund acquisition.  
 In Model 3, we employ the sample composed of the treatment group and the third control 
group. The results are qualitatively similar to the results in Model 1 and Model 2. The Treatment 
1 and Treatment 2 estimates suggest that rotators induce an increase in the NSF funding records 
of their early career colleagues.  
Concerning control variables, we find that academics with previous NSF funding in 
higher ranked universities, perhaps due to the availability of internal grant writing support or 
status effects, raise more funds from the NSF. We also document a suggestive positive 
relationship between non-NSF grants and NSF funding. Importantly, the Rotator Department 
minus 1 to 5 variables are not statistically significant indicating that the estimates are driven by 
the overlap with the rotator after her NSF experience.  
---Table 5 and Figure 1 about here--- 
 
To address our third research question we build logit models using the same setup of 
person year observations, the same set of right hand side variables and the samples used for 
Table 5. The models measure the change in probability of securing NSF grants of different size 
after interacting with a rotator (the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if in a given year the 
focal scientist receives a grant of a given size, 0 otherwise). As shown in Table 6, the probability 
of winning a grant is significantly higher for academics in the treatment group when compared to 
academics in the first control group (similar estimates for the other two control groups). The 
magnitude of the effects allows us to infer the sort of change that rotators bring about (research 
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question 3). An increase in the probability for academics to win grants in the treatment group is 
significant for small- to medium-sized grants (84 percent and 73 percent more likely for grants 
above $50,000 and $250,000, respectively); this probability diminishes for larger grants (23 
percent for grants above $500,000) and becomes non-existent for grants above $1 million. This 
finding is consistent with the $200,000 difference in fund acquisition between academics in the 
treatment and control groups, as reported in the baseline estimates. Importantly, it suggests that 
rotators, experienced individuals with informed priors as to how academic careers unfold, 
promote a “go-safe” approach as the most promising way forward for their early career 
colleagues.  
---Table 6 about here--- 
 
V. Robustness of the Results 
 
To measure the potential rotator effect, we include in the analysis, as a subgroup of the 210 
academics in the treatment group, 55 new hires who joined a department with a rotator after the 
rotator returned from the NSF. This modeling choice may plague the estimates if these 55 new 
hires choose to join the focal department because of the presence of the rotator among the faculty 
and the expected knowledge transfer from this rotator. To test whether such potential 
endogeneity biases our estimates in Test 1 in Table 7, we omit these new hires from the analysis 
(showing only the results with the first control group for ease of presentation). The results are 
qualitatively similar to the baseline estimates suggesting that this source of potential endogeneity 
does not influence our analysis. 
We reduce heterogeneity at the scientist level in the second control group based on the 
expectation that the same advisor and same graduation-year academics who joined departments 
without a rotator are similar to academics who joined departments with a rotator. In robustness 
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checks 2 and 3 (Table 7), we reduce heterogeneity by identifying similar academics via 
alternative means. First, we relax the “same graduation-year” criterion and run the regression on 
a sample that includes the following: a) academics who joined departments with a rotator and b) 
academics who joined a department without a rotator, had the same advisor, and graduated 3 to 
10 years before the focal academic. Second, we relax the “same advisor” criterion under the idea 
that several similar academics might not have the same advisor. Specifically, after we create a 
pool with all the academics who joined departments without a rotator, we identify similar 
academics from a different advisor, by using Coarsened Exact Matching,10 and include these 
academics in the sample we analyze together with the treatment group academics. The results are 
qualitatively similar to the baseline estimates, and hence our conclusions remain intact. 
---Table 7 about here--- 
 
Along the same lines, if unobserved factors in raising funds were not captured by our 
research design to compare new hires from the same university, advisor, and graduation year—if, 
for instance, the inherent ability of raising funds was not distributed normally among the 
population—then it would have been difficult to interpret our estimates as causal. Indeed, in test 
4 in Table 8, we employ a difference-in-difference specification under which early career 
scientists from different universities, advisor, and graduation-year enter the analysis either in the 
treatment or the control group. Academics who joined a department with a returning rotator 
before her return from the NSF belong to the treatment group and those who joined departments 
without a rotator belong to the control group. The dependent variable is the average NSF funds 
                                                     
10 We used the following matching criteria—PhD granting university ranking, H-Index at the time of 
joining the focal department, and having at least one first authored publication before the PhD graduation. 
In a separate test, presented in the Online Appendix, we created a random sample of academics who did 
not match the academics in the treatment group ex-ante so that we test whether our conclusions are tied to 
the way we construct the three control groups. We do not find evidence of such possibility. 
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raised by the focal individual during the three years before the return of the rotator (ex-ante 
period) or during the three years after the return of the rotator to the department (ex-post period). 
The allocation of scientists to treatment and control groups should be quasi-random as we do not 
expect most academics to select a department based on the presence of the rotator. Indeed, we 
include a variable that measures the number of years in the focal department to account for 
potential selection effects. The statistically significant positive interaction of the ex-post and 
treatment group variables is in line with the argument that we are unraveling causal effects. 11 
 ---Table 8 about here--- 
 
VI. The Mechanism Driving the Results 
 
In this section, we explore whether the findings we reveal are driven by mentoring from the 
rotator, or by other means. We present only the estimates using the first control group for 
brevity, whenever applicable, as we expect this control group to approximate the counterfactual 
as closely as possible. The results, available upon request, continue to be qualitatively similar 
when employing the remaining two control groups. 
In the first two tests, we scrutinize the mentoring/knowledge transfer mechanism. The 
first test starts with the premise that if the mechanism underpinning the results is mentoring 
advice from the rotator, including direction on how to frame a proposal and to which program to 
submit, then we would expect more helpful rotators to induce more pronounced changes in the 
funding acquisitions of their emerging colleagues. Similar to Laband and Tollison (2003) and 
Oettl (2012) and based on the intensity of the thank you notes in acknowledgements in PhD 
dissertations supervised by each rotator, we construct a helpfulness index using the sentiment 
                                                     
11 We have also tested for the influence of outlier observations and found no evidence that they impact the 
estimates materially. 
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analysis algorithm of Rinker (2013) and the weighted sentiment dictionary of Hu and Liu (2004). 
Higher values of the index correspond to more helpful rotators (we provide details in Appendix 
Table 2). Indeed, early career scientists in departments with rotators in the top 10th percentile of 
the helpfulness score raise, on average, $1,135,346 in the 5 years following the return of the 
rotator. The corresponding figure for early career scientists in remaining departments is 
$683,721. The t-test comparing the difference of the two figures is statistically significant at the 
5 percent level.  
The second test on knowledge transfer relies on the expectation that if rotators are indeed 
mentoring their early career colleagues, we would expect them to influence the topics these 
emerging scientists pursue. Specifically, prompted by work on cognitive mobility (Borjas and 
Doran 2015b), we check how similar is the dissertation abstract and the abstract of the first grant 
awarded within 3 years of the start of the Assistant Professor. After we source dissertation data 
from the ProQuest dissertations database, we develop a text similarity algorithm (details in 
Appendix Table 2) which yields a score ranging from 0 (no similarity) to 1 (high similarity). We 
then use the algorithm to compare the two abstracts. We compare two groups, both within 
departments with a returning rotator: those that started when the rotator was at the NSF and those 
that started when the rotator returned from the NSF. If rotators influence the direction of 
research, we should observe differences between these groups because those in the former group 
are considerably less likely than those in the latter group to have interacted with the rotator when 
writing their first grant proposal as Principal Investigator. Indeed, this is what we find. For 
academics who started when the rotator was at the NSF (hence did not interact with her when 
writing their proposals) the similarity score was 0.187.  For academics who interacted with the 
rotator right when she returned from the NSF the similarity score was 0.162. Rotators, at least in 
27 
 
the short run, push their early career colleagues away from their dissertation topic likely towards 
areas that they have insider knowledge the NSF is more keen on funding. 
While the tests above indicate mentoring from the rotator as the mechanism, the estimates 
could also be driven by knowledge transfer from co-authors or co-investigators who had success 
in raising funds from the NSF. To test for such potential mechanisms, we conduct three tests that 
are presented in Table 9. In the first test in Table 9, we omit from the analysis scientists whose 
more recent and frequent co-authors experienced improvement in their ex-post NSF funding 
record. Specifically, we omit from the analysis academics whose at least 1 of the 3 most frequent 
co-authors gained more NSF funding in the previous three years than the sample average. In the 
second test, we omit from the analysis scientists whose co-investigator in the focal grant had 
recent success with the NSF. In other words, after a focal academic’s co-investigator is awarded 
an NSF grant as a principal investigator, all subsequent person-year observations of this focal 
academic are omitted. In the third test, we limit the analysis to grants without co-investigators 
(69 percent of the grants had no co-investigators). The results from all three tests suggest that 
neither the co-authors nor the co-investigator account for the findings we reveal.  
---Table 9 about here--- 
 
Besides knowledge transfer from the rotator, the results could also be driven by scientists 
in the treatment departments working on “hot topics” that typically attract more funds. To test for 
such possibility, we conducted the following exercise. First, we counted the number of articles in 
the SCOPUS bibliographic database that include, in their list of keywords, the 3 most occurring 
keywords for articles published in 2010 by all academics in the sample. Subsequently, we 
counted the number of articles in SCOPUS that 5 years later, in 2014, included the same 
keywords. The number of articles that include in their list of keywords the 284 unique keywords 
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of the articles published by the 110 scientists in departments without a rotator who published in 
2010 increased by 27.7 percent. The corresponding increase for the 470 unique keywords from 
articles of the 168 scientists in departments with a rotator who published in 2010 was 23.7 
percent. The t-test comparing these two numbers was 0.8734 and it was statistically insignificant. 
We observe similar trends when we use articles published in 2008 and 2009 as our template. 
Therefore, academics in departments with and without a rotator appear to work on topics that 
increase in popularity in parallel. 
Similarly, the fact that the NSF picks a given scientist to be a rotator may indicate that the 
scientist’s research area is gaining traction and her department is more active in that area when 
compared to the other departments. The following factors lead us to discount this as a likely 
driver of the findings: a) as shown above, the control and treatment departments are similar to 
each other and their research topics grow in a similar fashion in popularity, b) the analysis 
includes fixed effects for science field, and c) rotators are rarely headhunted by the NSF; they are 
typically self-nominated and decide to apply for a rotator position mostly because they want to 
learn more about the NSF and contribute to the field of science. 12 
VII. Supplementary analysis 
 
In this section, we further elucidate the driver of our findings by exploring whether the estimates 
are driven by an increase in the applications submitted by the rotator’s colleagues upon her 
return, whether the applications submitted are of higher quality, or/and whether they are better 
                                                     
12 The presence of a former rotator in a given department may induce increased visibility of the 
department. At the extreme, this visibility may cause favoritism for the applications submitted by the 
rotator’s colleagues (if, for instance, successor rotators are more lenient towards the returned rotator’s 
colleagues). The Online Appendix includes tests that dismiss this possibility. An additional exercise, also 
placed in the Online Appendix, tests, via a placebo test, whether the effects we observe are tied to the 
actual timing of the return of the rotator, and not any other point in time. We find that they are. 
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targeted and hence are more likely to be successful. Because the NSF does not release rejected 
applications on an individual basis, we cannot address the question directly. However, empirical 
exercises described below suggest that, for the largest part, the estimates are not driven by an 
increased number of applications but an improvement in the quality of the submitted 
applications.  
First, in unreported results, we econometrically find that rotators do not have an effect on 
the number of awarded grants. If more applications correlated with an increase in awarded 
grants, then this finding would imply that the rotator effect stems from direction and feedback, 
among others, for better and more carefully targeted proposals. Second, as shown in Table 6 
above, and discussed in section IV the probability of winning a grant is significantly higher for 
academics in the treatment group when compared to academics in the first control group. This is 
supportive of our expectation because better and more carefully targeted proposals (and not 
necessarily more) are more likely to be funded.  
In the last set of supplementary analyses, we inform the mechanism that drives the results 
by shedding light on why we observe an effect in Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 but not in the 
later treatment years. We consider two main potential explanations. First, in line with the above 
discussion that an increase in the number of applications to the NSF does not drive the results, it 
is possible that once the focal academic raises a grant in, for instance, the treatment year 2, then 
the academic would devote time toward conducting the research of that grant instead of 
submitting additional grant applications. To test this proposition, we start with the premise that 
more grants correlate with more number of applications. Subsequently, in Table 10, we limit the 
analysis to the top 3 directorates in terms of the number of grants awarded from 2006 to 2016 
(i.e., engineering, computer science, math, and physics), and hence the need for a continuous 
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flow of grants is larger. If the lack of applications following the award of a grant would drive the 
results, then among fields of this kind we would expect an effect in the later treatment years. 
However, this is contrary to our observation. Second, it is possible that the rotator’s effect wanes 
over time in that the insights and knowledge gained by a rotator are not updated as the NSF 
progresses, likely changes focus, and priorities, among others. The figures in Table 11 do not 
dismiss such possibility. The longer the rotator stays away from the NSF, the lesser will be the 
gain of the new hires in their first year of overlap with the rotator. To illustrate, if the rotator 
returns at year t, hires who join the department at t-1 and at t, raise, on average, $135,467 and 
$130,252 at t and t+1, respectively. On the other hand, those who joined the department during 
t+1 raise $70,144 in t+2.  
---Tables 10 and 11 about here--- 
 
Overall, the tests devised to understand the reason behind the absence of an effect past 
Treatment 2 imply that the following two forces are at play: a) increased workload after the 
award of a grant that limits the number of new applications and b) diminishing applicability of 
the insights that the rotator conveys as the NSF changes over time. Empirically, we cannot 
separate the two forces mainly because the NSF does not provide access to rejected applications 
and it is prohibitively difficult to measure with accuracy whether the relevance of the rotator’s 
insights indeed diminishes over time.  
 
VIII. Conclusions 
 
We study knowledge spillovers from academics with a temporary experience in government jobs 
and reveal evidence consistent with a causal link between an increase in the NSF funding record 
of newly hired assistant professors and their exposure to academics in their department who 
return after their tenure at the NSF as PDs (rotators). We document an economically meaningful 
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increase (approximately $200,000 more, which is nearly half of the average of the first-time 
grant from the NSF) which arises from mentoring as rotators advise their colleagues on what to 
write in and how to write a proposal and where to send a proposal. Importantly, the gains from 
having access to a rotator diminish sharply with time which implies that recent insights (and not 
general knoweldge) gained via short tenure at continuously evolving funding organizations such 
as the NSF are required to induce gains in resource acquisition among early career academics. 
Rotator’s colleagues are more likely to secure medium-sized (but not large) grants and this 
finding implies that informal mentoring encourages a “go-safe” and not a “go-big” approach at 
the formative stages of one’s career.  
 Overall, our research highlights that insiders, individuals with insights of an organization 
type that is different from the one in which they are permanently employed, can generate positive 
spillovers for their colleagues. These findings contribute to the literature analyzing the effects of 
access to high human capital in academia (Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and Wang 2010, Waldinger 
2016, 2012, 2010, Borjas and Doran 2012, Borjas and Doran 2015a, Colussi 2018) by adding 
novel evidence on gains from high human capital with insights from experience outside 
academia. As well, the work speaks directly to the literatures on success in science 
(Kelchtermans and Veugelers 2013, Kahn and MacGarvie 2016), academic mentoring (Blau et 
al. 2010, Heggeness et al. 2018) and resource acquisition (Feinberg and Price 2004, Arora and 
Gambardella 2005, Li 2017, Grimpe 2012). Broadly, the results are informative for the academic 
labor market too. Apparently, rotators with recent experience at the NSF are equipped to 
contribute positively toward the careers of their colleagues by inducing significant changes in 
early fund acquisition. Essentially, the presence of a rotator in a given department may be a 
decisive factor when selecting a job offer. 
32 
 
The work also breaks new ground in the emerging literature on the effects of experience 
outside academia using the rotation program as its template (Kolympiris, Hoenen, and Klein 
2018). We bring to light three new findings: a) rotators benefit their early career colleagues 
considerably more than they benefit other colleagues, b) their effects decay with time and c) 
rotators have no effect on the acquisition of larger grants. Still, we have only started to scratch 
the surface before we understand what experience outside academia entails, the sorts of 
knowledge spillovers it can generate and the conditions that shape the magnitude of those 
spillovers. Rotators are main actors in the knowledge economy (Li and Marrongelle 2013), but 
have received considerably less attention in the literature when compared to inventors, 
entrepreneurs, patent examiners, and others (e.g. Lampe 2012, Lemley and Sampat 2012, 
Toivanen and Väänänen 2012, Moser, Voena, and Waldinger 2014, Jensen and Thursby 2001). 
As such, the research program on knowledge transfer from insights gained outside academia can 
be extended in a number of ways and we see at least two as immediate additions to the present 
work. One, what is the full extent of knowledge transmission from rotators? For instance, we do 
not know a) whether the recipients of the rotator’s knowledge share this knowledge with others, 
likely outside their institution, b) whether the seminars rotators often give outside their university 
also generate gains in NSF funding and c) whether the collaborators of rotators also accumulate 
new knowledge or whether they are left behind. This is an important line of inquiry to investigate 
because it has implications for the organization of the distribution of research funding, among 
others. Two, besides mentoring their early career colleagues to win grants, do rotators have any 
influence in how these grants are best utilized? Addressing this question is relevant because it 
can inform the literature about the long term effects rotators may have for academic careers and 
for scientific progress at large. 
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    Our research is timely and has policy implications. Because scientific advancements are 
built on the progress of early career scientists, it is imperative to explore ways in which these 
early career scientists can gain access to relevant resources that can contribute toward scientific 
advancements. Indeed, the difficulties this cohort of academics faces in securing resources is a 
cause for concern (Poirazi 2017), and it may impede the scientific progress and harm the overall 
social welfare (Alberts et al. 2014, Nature_Editorial 2016). Policymakers have started to take 
initiatives mostly by altering the institutional environment to ensure that it improves the chances 
of early career scientists in raising research funds (Kaiser 2017). Here, we demonstrate that 
informal mentoring, tapping into existing knowledge held by colleagues’ human capital, might 
also be a complementary and less resource-intensive strategy with immediate results that would 
address one of the main obstacles early career academics face—lack of experience and insights; 
this obstacle puts them at a disadvantage as they often compete for the same grants with high-
status scientists who have established funding and publication records.  
Along the same lines, this study speaks directly to the design of the rotation program. 
Under the premise that home universities gain from the rotation program, a recent policy 
mandates that they cover part of the rotation program bill (Mervis 2016). Here, while we do not 
fully measure the benefits and the costs of the program, we do find that home institutions realize 
gains from returning rotators.  
Our analysis, albeit careful, has caveats that render it incomplete; hence our study is 
subject to improvements. First, we follow previous contributions (e.g Kahn and MacGarvie 
2016) to construct one of our control groups by matching on observable characteristics such as 
having the same PhD advisor. Success in raising funds may be driven by unobservable factors, 
which we cannot account for in this study. Our expectation, however, is that the unobserved 
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factors correlate, at least to a certain extent, with the observable factors. The difference-in-
difference analysis that we conducted as a robustness check supports this expectation. Second, 
we focus on early career scientists who land their first faculty position in the US. However, all 
the PhD holders do not follow such a career trajectory (Sauermann and Roach 2016). 
Accordingly, our analysis is conditional on early career scientists having secured a faculty 
position in a US university. We do not see this as a major concern, per se, because our focus is 
not on who lands a US faculty post in the first place as we compare only similar emerging 
scientists who follow an academic career in similar institutional environments. Third, the 
analysis focuses on the US, and hence the results may not generalize directly to other countries 
as the rotation setting is unique to the NSF. This uniqueness of the rotation program at the NSF 
together with our estimates gives rise to the question whether other funding agencies in the US 
and elsewhere would benefit from a similar setting. This is because the diffusion of knowledge 
that we document is likely predicated on the design of the NSF that requires the inclusion of 
external academics in its grant review process not only as reviewers but also, and perhaps more 
importantly, in more central roles as decision makers.  
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Table 1. Selected statistics for the academics in the treatment and control groups. 
  Treatment group 1st control group 
  
210 academics who, as their first faculty post, joined a 
department with a rotator between the 5 years before 
and 2 years after the rotator returned. 
25 academics who, as their first faculty post, joined a 
department with a rotator  but did not overlap with 
the rotator 
  Average 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max Average 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Previous NSF funding at the start of the faculty post ($M) 0.028 0.115 0.000 0.761 0.045 0.201 0.000 1.001 
Yearly NSF funding from the start of the faculty post until 
the rotator's return from the NSF ($M) 0.015 0.049 0.000 0.349 0.014 0.108 0.000 0.240 
Total NSF funding in the 5 years ex-post rotator return ($M)  0.494 0.730 0.000 3.420 0.253 0.540 0.000 2.253 
Male 0.714 0.453 0.000 1.000 0.683 0.720 0.000 1.000 
Years as a Post-Doc 2.181 2.006 0.000 10.000 2.320 1.600 0.000 5.000 
H-index at the time of the first faculty post 1.921 2.147 0.000 10.000 2.339 2.556 0.000 9.000 
Yearly non-NSF funding until first faculty post  ($M) 0.006 0.054 0.000 0.750 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.050 
Years between PhD graduation and first faculty post 2.683 1.962 0.000 10.000 2.817 2.400 0.000 7.000 
First author publication before PhD graduation 0.751 0.433 0.000 1.000 0.654 0.478 0.000 1.000 
For the Treatment group the Rotator Department and Treatment variables take the value of 1 as follows: RotatorDepartment-5: 40 RotatorDepartment-4: 56, 
RotatorDepartment-3: 65, RotatorDepartment-2: 86, RotatorDepartment-1: 199, Treatment 0: 214 Treatment 1: 206, Treatment 2: 204, Treatment 3: 204, Treatment 4: 202, 
Treatment 5: 200. Depending on the distribution of the variables we conducted different tests to check whether the variables differ statistically across groups. We discovered the 
following differences at the 5 percent significance level or below. Treatment versus 1st control group:  non-NSF funding (two sided t-test) and first author publication before 
PhD (chi-squared). Treatment versus 2nd control group (all Mann–Whitney U test):  Previous NSF funding, Total NSF funding in the 5 years ex-post rotator return, H-index and 
years as post doc.  Treatment versus 3rd control group:  Total NSF funding in the 5 years ex-post rotator return (Mann–Whitney U test). 
 
  
Table 1 continued. Selected statistics for the academics in the treatment and control groups.  
  2nd control group 3rd control group 
  
105 academics who, as their first faculty post, joined 
departments without a rotator and had the same 
advisor and similar graduation year as academics who 
joined departments with a rotator 
60 academics who, as their first faculty post, joined a 
department without a rotator in the rotator's 
university in a similar department 
  Average 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max Average 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Previous NSF funding at the start of the faculty post ($M) 0.003 0.019 0.000 0.150 0.034 0.181 0.000 1.270 
Yearly NSF funding from the start of the faculty post until the 
rotator's return from the NSF ($M) 0.014 0.058 0.000 0.401 0.007 0.038 0.000 0.260 
Total NSF funding in the 5 years ex-post rotator return ($M) 0.261 0.717 0.000 5.689 0.238 0.395 0.000 1.675 
Male 0.683 0.468 0.000 1.000 0.733 0.446 0.000 1.000 
Years as a Post-Doc 2.308 2.252 0.000 9.000 2.650 1.830 0.000 8.000 
H-index at the time of the first faculty post 1.587 2.032 0.000 8.000 2.600 2.294 0.000 7.000 
Yearly non-NSF funding until first faculty post  ($M) 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.065 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.015 
Years between PhD graduation and first faculty post 2.817 2.550 0.000 11.000 3.017 2.221 0.000 8.000 
First author publication before PhD graduation 0.654 0.478 0.000 1.000 0.783 0.415 0.000 1.000 
 
Table 2. Departments with and without a rotator raise similar amounts from the NSF. 
 Average yearly department NSF funding the five year preceding the rotator’s return from the NSF. 
  Total Per faculty member 
Department with a returning rotator  $             1,111,788   $                  34,903  
Department without a returning rotator  $             1,220,669   $                  33,467  
Two sided t-tests reveal that the differences between the two columns are not statistically significant at the 5 or 1 percent level.  
Table 3. Departments with and without a rotator are of similar status and research productivity. 
  
  
Departments with 
a rotator 
Departments 
without a rotator 
Member of the Association of American Universities  55% 50% 
Department Shanghai ranking the year the rotator’ 
return  
First quartile 23% 26% 
Second 
quartile 17% 15% 
Two sided t-tests reveal that the differences between the two columns are not statistically significant at the 5 or 1 percent level.  
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the 64 sample rotators who ended their rotation between 2009 and 2011 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Years in rotation 1.625 0.951 1.000 5.000 
Male 0.730 0.447 0.000 1.000 
Career age at start of rotation 21.500 8.214 8.000 31.000 
Publications (5 years ex-ante) 11.627 11.697 0.000 42.000 
Citations per paper (5 years ex-ante) 15.667 27.482 0.000 108.080 
NSF funding (5 years ex-ante) $643,205 $1,747,756 $0.000  $ 13,086,007 
 
  
Table 5. OLS Baseline Estimates. Dependent Variable is NSF funding in million. 
 MODEL 1  
Treatment Group & 
1st Control Group 
MODEL 2  
Treatment Group & 
2nd Control Group 
MODEL 3  
Treatment Group & 
3rd Control Group 
    
RotatorDepartment t-5 -0.014 -0.010 -0.003 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) 
RotatorDepartment t-4 0.059 0.079 0.099 
 (0.040) (0.045) (0.055) 
RotatorDepartment t-3 -0.010 0.002 0.019 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
RotatorDepartment t-2 0.007 0.005 0.029 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
RotatorDepartment t-1 0.007 -0.003 0.010 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) 
Treatment 0 0.034 0.037 0.040 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) 
Treatment 1 0.092*** 0.058** 0.070** 
 (0.032) (0.026) (0.027) 
Treatment 2 0.113*** 0.061** 0.088*** 
 (0.036) (0.026) (0.024) 
Treatment 3 0.072** 0.034 0.042** 
 (0.035) (0.018) (0.019) 
Treatment 4 0.030 0.007 0.005 
 (0.037) (0.020) (0.024) 
Treatment 5 -0.000 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.033) (0.025) (0.026) 
PostDoc -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Assistant Professor 0.017 0.025** 0.011 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) 
Associate Professor 0.009 0.008 -0.007 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) 
Male -0.001 0.013 0.010 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
H-index -0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
External Funding ($M) 0.355 0.381** 0.341 
 (0.186) (0.181) (0.187) 
Previous NSF ($M) 0.113*** 0.098*** 0.122*** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) 
Ranking -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Faculty NSF ($M) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.039 0.035 -0.004 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.019) 
    
Science field FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 2,152 2,642 2,319 
R2 0.170 0.156 0.179 
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.144 0.166 
Number of Departments 65 158 80 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the department level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
  
Table 6. Change in probability of securing an NSF grant after the rotator returns. 
  
Grant larger than 
$50,000 
Grant larger than 
$250,000 
Grant larger than 
$500,000 
Grant larger than 
$1,000,000 
Year of rotator return 0.167 ** 0.157 ** 0.05   -0.007   
1 year after rotator return 0.214 *** 0.198 *** 0.116 *** 0.018   
2 years after rotator return 0.235 ** 0.226 *** 0.109 *** 0.010   
3 years after rotator return 0.224 ** 0.145 ** 0.007   -0.005   
4 years after rotator return 0.096   0.035   0.012   -0.003   
5 years after rotator return 0.062   0.038   0.003   -0.004   
The change in probability is calculated after holding all other variables at their means   
 
Table 7. Omit from the treatment group new hires who join the rotator department after the rotator has 
returned + Relax same advisor and graduation year criteria   
 Test 1 
Omit hires who joined  
Test 2 
Add academics with the same 
advisor who graduated 3 to 10 years 
before the focal academic who 
joined a department with a rotator 
Test 3 
Use Coarsened Exact 
Matching to populate 
the control group 
 the department after 
the rotator returned 
    
RotatorDepartment t-5 -0.010 0.008 -0.009 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.069) 
RotatorDepartment t-4 0.067 0.081** 0.046 
 (0.041) (0.038) (0.054) 
RotatorDepartment t-3 -0.000 -0.005 0.023 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.047) 
RotatorDepartment t-2 0.007 0.003 0.036 
 (0.029) (0.023) (0.036) 
RotatorDepartment t-1 0.007 -0.022 0.003 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.027) 
Treatment 0 0.032 0.025 0.054** 
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.023) 
Treatment 1 0.098*** 0.055** 0.064*** 
 (0.037) (0.026) (0.021) 
Treatment 2 0.119** 0.072*** 0.060*** 
 (0.045) (0.024) (0.020) 
Treatment 3 0.084** 0.039** 0.026 
 (0.042) (0.017) (0.020) 
Treatment 4 0.033 0.006 0.003 
 (0.042) (0.020) (0.019) 
Treatment 5 -0.010 0.004 0.001 
 (0.046) (0.024) (0.019) 
PostDoc -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Assistant Professor 0.010 0.030*** 0.013 
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.019) 
Associate Professor 0.006 0.016 -0.008 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.021) 
Male 0.002 0.012 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) 
H-index -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
External Funding ($M) 0.395** 0.338 -0.038 
 (0.176) (0.186) (0.055) 
Previous NSF ($M) 0.111*** 0.096*** 0.104*** 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.009) 
Ranking -0.006 -0.006** -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Faculty NSF ($M) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.034 -0.019 -0.022 
 (0.022) (0.015) (0.045) 
    
Science field FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 1,800 3,181 2,654 
R2 0.197 0.138 0.094 
Adjusted R2 0.179 0.127 0.0813 
Number of Departments 180 193 66 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the department level  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
  
Table 8. Robustness Check 4. Difference-in-difference estimation. 
After 0.032 
 (0.022) 
Treatment -0.010 
 (0.020) 
After * Treatment 0.070** 
 (0.030) 
PostDoc -0.010** 
 (0.005) 
Assistant Professor 0.018 
 (0.024) 
Associate Professor -0.015 
 (0.036) 
Male -0.004 
 (0.022) 
H-index 0.002 
 (0.001) 
External Funding ($M) 0.012 
 (0.048) 
Previous NSF ($M)  0.296*** 
 (0.108) 
Ranking -0.009 
 (0.006) 
Faculty NSF ($M) 0.000 
 (0.001) 
Constant 0.121** 
 (0.061) 
  
Science field FE YES 
Year FE YES 
Observations 426 
R2 0.185 
Adjusted R2 0.132 
Number of Departments 141 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the department level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
 
  
Table 9. Neither co-authors nor co-investigators drive the baseline estimates  
 
Omit co-authors 
with recent 
success in raising 
NSF grants 
Omit all person-year 
observations after a recent Co-I 
is awarded an NSF grant 
Omit NSF grants with a 
Co-I 
    
RotatorDepartment t-5 -0.031 -0.025 -0.012 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) 
RotatorDepartment t-4 0.021 0.024 0.022 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.022) 
RotatorDepartment t-3 -0.019 -0.005 -0.010 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.011) 
RotatorDepartment t-2 -0.015 -0.009 0.027 
 (0.032) (0.030) (0.016) 
RotatorDepartment t-1 -0.013 -0.016 0.003 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) 
Treatment 0 0.028 0.028 0.025 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) 
Treatment 1 0.090** 0.067*** 0.083** 
 (0.044) (0.025) (0.036) 
Treatment 2 0.135*** 0.081** 0.077** 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.030) 
Treatment 3 0.039 0.046 0.033 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) 
Treatment 4 0.007 0.016 0.015 
 (0.032) (0.026) (0.028) 
Treatment 5 -0.015 0.021 0.004 
 (0.035) (0.016) (0.015) 
PostDoc -0.003 -0.002 -0.004** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Assistant Professor 0.018 0.017 0.015 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.009) 
Associate Professor 0.005 0.009 0.009 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.011) 
Male -0.001 -0.011 0.001 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) 
H-index -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
External Funding ($M) -0.070** -0.031 0.061 
 (0.034) (0.029) (0.076) 
Previous NSF ($M) 0.113*** 0.131*** 0.060*** 
 (0.015) (0.024) (0.018) 
Ranking -0.002 -0.005 -0.007*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Faculty NSF ($M) 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.025 0.001 0.046*** 
 (0.026) (0.017) (0.015) 
    
Science field FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 1,784 1,843 2,031 
R2 0.112 0.100 0.083 
Adjusted R2 0.0930 0.0808 0.0656 
Number of Departments 65 65 65 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at department level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
Table 10. Limit the analysis to the top 3 directorates in  
terms of the number of grants awarded from 2005 to 2016.  
 Treatment Group & 1st Control Group 
  
RotatorDepartment t-5 -0.028 
 (0.026) 
RotatorDepartment t-4 0.019 
 (0.044) 
RotatorDepartment t-3 0.013 
 (0.025) 
RotatorDepartment t-2 0.049 
 (0.036) 
RotatorDepartment t-1 -0.015 
 (0.036) 
Treatment 0 0.029 
 (0.041) 
Treatment 1 0.139** 
 (0.059) 
Treatment 2 0.175** 
 (0.075) 
Treatment 3 0.118 
 (0.106) 
Treatment 4 0.089 
 (0.091) 
Treatment 5 -0.023 
 (0.049) 
PostDoc -0.009*** 
 (0.002) 
Assistant Professor 0.029 
 (0.030) 
Associate Professor 0.001 
 (0.029) 
Male -0.006 
 (0.025) 
H-index -0.000 
 (0.001) 
External Funding ($M) -0.073 
 (0.074) 
Previous NSF ($M) 0.113*** 
 (0.021) 
Ranking -0.012** 
 (0.006) 
Faculty NSF ($M) -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Constant 0.097** 
 (0.043) 
  
Science field FE YES 
Year FE YES 
Observations 893 
R2 0.132 
Adjusted R2 0.096 
Number of Departments 27 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the department level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
  
Table 11. The longer the rotator has been away from the NSF, the less new hires in their first year of overlap 
with the rotator gain. 
  
Average NSF funding acquired during first three years of 
overlap with rotator after return from NSF  
Variable Tr0 Tr1 Tr2 Tr3 Tr4 
Joined 1 year before the rotator returned $135,467 $262,451 $217,168   
Joined the same year the rotator returned $11,349 $130,252 $130,834 
  
Joined 1 year after the rotator returned 
 $28,518 $70,144 $61,849  
Joined 2 years after the rotator returned     $36,058 $24,383 $78,931 
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Figure 1: Dynamics of the rotator effect
Solid fill: Significant at 5% or less
Appendix Table 1. Sample rotators are representative of the population of rotators.  
  
64 Rotators who ended 
their rotation in 2009-
2011 and are in the 
sample. 
176 Rotators who 
ended their rotation in 
2009-2011 and are not 
in the sample. 
All 816 Rotators 
between 2004 and 
2014. 
Years in rotation 1.625 1.862 1.971 
Male 0.730 0.678 0.714 
Career age at start of rotation 21.500 22.111 23.372 
Publications (5 years ex-ante)  11.627 13.894 11.661 
Citations per paper (5 years ex-ante) 15.667 14.930 13.100 
NSF funding (5 years ex-ante) $643,205 $697,347 $699,332 
  
 Appendix Table 2. Details on the construction of selected variables 
Variable 
Code 
Description Construction  
Dependent 
Variable 
Sum of NSF funding received in the person-year. The 
sum does not include grant extensions of 
continuations. 
We first look up last names of faculty members at the NSF grant database 
(https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download.jsp). Then, using first name(s) and 
institution records, the correct person ID is identified manually. Finally, the sum 
of NSF funds in the specific person-years is calculated. 
 
Rotator 
Department / 
Treatment  
 
A range of 11 variables that take the value of 1 when 
the focal academic was in the department of the 
rotator for the specific year. Example: A rotator 
returns to his department in 2010 and an academic 
starts his position at this department in 2006. For the 
person-year 2007, RotatorDepartment-3 takes the 
value of 1. For the person-year 2012, Treatment2 
takes the value of 1.  
For every academic who joins a rotator department we retrieve the year the rotator 
returns to the department and calculate for each person-year observation how 
many years this specific observation is removed from the year of rotator return. 
Then, we distribute the result of this calculation over the range of Rotator 
Department and Treatment variables.  
 
PostDoc Measures the number of years the focal new hire was 
employed in a post-doctoral position before assuming 
a faculty post. 
Professional history was collected manually from CVs originating from 
university, laboratory, personal websites and Linkedin.  
 
Assistant 
Professor and 
Associate 
Professor 
Takes the value of 1 for person-years the focal 
academic has an Assistant Professor or Associate 
Professor position respectively, and 0 otherwise.  
Professional history was collected manually from CVs originating from 
university, laboratory, personal websites and Linkedin. 
 
Male Takes the value of 1 for academics who are male.  Determined manually from faculty websites and personal websites.  
H-index Time-varying H-5 citation index of the academic in 
question. For example: An H-5 index of 3 is read as 
“In the last 5 years, there have been at least 3 
publications that have each been cited 3 times or 
more.”  
All the SCOPUS indexed publications of the rotator are extracted and then the h-
index for the specific person-year is generated. 
 
External 
Funding 
Sum of funding received in the person-year period 
that does not originate from the NSF.  
Funding history was collected manually from CVs originating from university, 
laboratory, personal websites and Linkedin. Additionally, National Institutes of 
Health records were cross-examined with our observations.  
 
Previous NSF Sum of NSF funding received before the specific 
person-year 
For each identified academic, the sum of NSF funding in the 5 years before the 
focal person-year is calculated. 
 
Ranking Takes the value of 1 if the university is ranked in the 
first Shanghai ranking quartile for the specific field 
and year of rotation, 2 if the university is ranked in 
the second quartile, 3 if the university is ranked in the 
third quartile and 4 if the university is ranked in the 
For each specific science field and year of rotation, the Shanghai ranking of the 
universities is configured into quartiles. 
 
lowest quartile for the specific field and year of 
rotation. 
Faculty NSF Measures the sum of NSF funds raised by existing 
faculty members in the rotator’s department before 
the rotator’s return from the NSF 
The websites of the academic units are visited for the year the rotator returns 
using https://web.archive.org/. For each faculty member not in adjunct or emeritus 
positions the sum of NSF funding before the year of the rotator’s return is 
calculated.  
 
Science Field 
FE 
Dummy variables that reflects the science field of 
each focal scientist's academic unit 
For each academic unit we measure the number of NSF awards from each 
Directorate over time. The 7 Directorates are Biological Sciences, Computer & 
Information Science, Education & Human Resources, Engineering, Geosciences, 
Mathematical & Physical Sciences, Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences. We 
determine the science field (and include associated dummy variables) by 
identifying the Directorate that has awarded the most grants to the focal academic 
unit. 
 
- Helpfulness algorithm discussed in section VI. 
Average 'sentiment score' of acknowledgements 
made to the rotator in PhD dissertations. 
We collect dissertations that include the rotator’s name from ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses. For each dissertation wherein the rotator is mentioned 
in the acknowledgement section, the section referring the rotator is analyzed using 
the both the sentiment analysis algorithm from Rinker (2013)’s quantitative data 
analysis package in R (qdap) and Hu and Liu (2004)’s weighted sentiment 
dictionary of over 7000 words. We generate a ‘polarity score’ for each 
dissertation acknowledgement by each rotator. The polarity score (in our case, the 
level of gratitude) is a function of the number of positive and negative words (eg. 
‘supportive’), amplifiers or negators in proximity to these words (e.g. ‘very 
supportive’) and the length of the acknowledgement. In two examples below the 
first acknowledgment uses only one positive word (“thank”), the second 
acknowledgement uses seven positive words ("thank", "supportive", "respectful", 
"freedom", "trust", "work", "guidance") and three amplifiers (“always”, “truly”, 
“always”).   
 
1. “I thank my advisor, Prof. [rotator’s last name], for taking his time to supervise 
this thesis despite his sabbatical leave.” Polarity score: 0.224. 
2. “First, I want to thank my academic advisor, [rotator’s full name], who has 
always been a supportive friend and a truly respectful person. Over the years, 
[rotator’s first name] has given me freedom and trust to work on my own, but she 
has always taken time out of her busy schedule whenever guidance was needed.” 
Polarity score: 1.525.  
 
The variable is constructed as the average polarity score across dissertations. 
 
- Similarity algorithm discussed in section VI We have used a similarity algorithm to measure the similarity between texts. 
Before the actual comparison between the dissertation and the grant abstract, the 
algorithm eliminates very short words, common words like ‘the’ and ‘a’. 
 
Numbers are removed as well. A ‘stemming’ algorithm is applied to convert 
words to the same base or root form to increase matching of the same words. The 
actual similarity score is calculated by splitting every text in the dataset into 
separate words/terms. Every term receives a weight by term frequency-inverse 
document frequency(tf-idf). This value increases the relevance of terms by how 
often it is present within a text and offset by how often it is present within all texts 
in the corpus. Using the weighted terms for each text a vector is created which in 
turn is used to measure the cosine of the normalized vectors to make similarity 
comparisons. The final score is a number ranging from 0 to 1. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
 
 
Specification including department and scientist fixed effects (referenced in section III, 
subsection F) 
 
Online Appendix Table 1. Models with department and scientist fixed effects 
 MODEL 1  
Treatment Group & 
1st Control Group 
MODEL 2  
Treatment Group & 
2nd Control Group 
MODEL 3  
Treatment Group & 
3rd Control Group 
    
RotatorDepartment t-5 -0.049** -0.092*** -0.082** 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.031) 
RotatorDepartment t-4 0.024 -0.013 0.013 
 (0.037) (0.048) (0.055) 
RotatorDepartment t-3 -0.029 -0.041 -0.030 
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.032) 
RotatorDepartment t-2 -0.013 -0.026 -0.012 
 (0.030) (0.038) (0.040) 
RotatorDepartment t-1 -0.022 -0.041 -0.037 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.034) 
Treatment 0 0.011 0.018 0.008 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.038) 
Treatment 1 0.076*** 0.052** 0.050 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.027) 
Treatment 2 0.098*** 0.058** 0.072*** 
 (0.030) (0.026) (0.024) 
Treatment 3 0.064 0.035 0.032 
 (0.036) (0.028) (0.029) 
Treatment 4 0.036 0.020 0.006 
 (0.041) (0.031) (0.035) 
Treatment 5 0.010 0.012 0.000 
 (0.037) (0.031) (0.034) 
PostDoc -0.356*** 0.551*** 0.141*** 
 (0.022) (0.042) (0.026) 
Assistant Professor 0.006 0.016 0.012 
 (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) 
Associate Professor -0.009 -0.008 -0.016 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
Male -0.691*** 0.077*** -0.547 
 (0.024) (0.011) (0.084) 
H-index 0.000 0.002 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
External Funding ($M) 0.386 0.405** 0.373 
 (0.211) (0.205) (0.213) 
Previous NSF ($M) -0.008 -0.033 0.007 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
Ranking -5.230*** -0.022*** -0.286 
 (0.342) (0.007) (0.044) 
Faculty NSF ($M) -0.033*** -0.393*** -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.036) (0.000) 
Constant 28.545*** -2.792*** 1.194*** 
 (1.840) (0.188) (0.179) 
    
Science field FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Department FE YES YES YES 
Scientist FE YES YES YES 
Observations 2,152 2,642 2,319 
R2 0.286 0.280 0.283 
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.173 0.177 
Number of Departments 65 158 80 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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Randomly selected control group (referenced in footnote 10) 
 
To test whether the estimates are tied to the way we construct the control groups we construct 
a random sample of academics and compared their NSF funds acquisition to the NSF fund 
acquisition of the academics in the treatment group. We proceeded as follows:  
 
First, we randomly selected half (58), out of the 115 R1 Universities according to the 
Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education. Within these 58 universities, we 
visited current and archived university websites to compile a random list of 232 newly hired 
assistant professors across time in different departments (4 academics per university 
randomly chosen from the same or different departments). Of the 232 academics, 209 had 
started their tenure track in more recent years (after 2004) and we were able to source reliable 
comprehensive information for 126 (e.g. when in doubt for name disambiguation we err on 
the side of caution to avoid potential false positives and negatives). The information was 
sourced from a) the list of doctoral graduates in the US provided by the ProQuest 
dissertations database and b) the list of faculty members in the US provided by the Men and 
Women of Science. These randomly selected 126 academics received their PhD from 89 
different universities (21 outside the US) between 2004 and 2012, spent, on average, 2.5 
years in post-doctoral positions and were employed at 32 departments within 34 R1 
universities (31 of these academics changed university at some point in their career).   
 
Then, based on data from the NSF data retrieval website we compare the NSF grant 
acquisition of these 126 academics in the 5 first years past their tenure track appointment 
with the equivalent NSF acquisition record of the academics in our treatment group. As 
shown in Table 1 in the manuscript academics in the treatment group raise close to $500,000, 
nearly half of which we attribute to knowledge transfer from the rotator.  The average NSF 
fund acquisition for the equivalent period for the randomly selected control group was 
$269,517 ($151,220 for the three first years of the first tenure track post). With the caveat of 
small sample size in mind, even when we do not match on ex-ante characteristics to populate 
the control groups we still find that colleagues of rotators raise considerably more than other 
early career scientists. We do not find evidence that the estimates we present are tied to the 
construction of the control group. 
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Test for favoritism (referenced in footnote 12) 
 
The presence of a former rotator in a given department may induce increased visibility of the 
department. This visibility may cause favoritism for the applications submitted by the 
rotator’s colleagues (if, for instance, successor rotators are more lenient towards the returned 
rotator’s colleagues). We conducted several tests that lead us to discount such a possibility.  
First, under favoritism we would expect to observe growth in funding among those 
colleagues that have an established funding record with the NSF. In unreported results, we 
find that this does not hold. Second, under favoritism the grants of rotator’s colleagues would 
be of lower quality when compared to other NSF grants. However, Online Appendix Table 2 
demonstrates that the number of publications and citations coming out of rotator colleagues’ 
grants are not statistically different than the number of publications and citations coming out 
of grants awarded during the period 2009–2011 to the sample investigators that do not belong 
to departments with a rotator. Third, though this was not part of our research design, none of 
the academics that we analyzed submitted a funded proposal in the ex-post period jointly with 
the rotator. Finally, none of the rotators co-authored a publication with the sample academics 
ex-ante or ex-post, which addresses the possibility of “ghost” co-authorship in the funded 
proposals.  
 
Online Appendix Table 2.  Grants of scientists in treatment and conrol groups yield similar outcomes 
  
2009 to 2011 grants of scientists in 
departments with a rotator   
2009 to 2011 grants of scientists in 
departments without a rotator     
Variable   Mean  Standard Deviation       Mean  Standard Deviation  Two-sides t-test 
Publications   6.385   0.854       6.667   1.375   0.859 
Citations   322.517   83.296       281.462   112.260   0.781 
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Placebo test (referenced in footnote 12) 
 
To test whether the effects we observe are tied to the actual timing of the return of the rotator, 
and not any other point in time, we follow Brogaard, Engelberg, and Parsons (2014), to 
construct a placebo test and include “false” rotator appointments. We conduct two exercises. 
In the first exercise, within departments with a rotator, we randomly pick a year between 
2006 and 2011 that we define as the year in which the rotator supposedly returned from the 
NSF. Accordingly, for this exercise, the Treatment variables are by design false (except when 
the random return year overlaps with the true return year). In the second exercise, we 
artificially treat the same advisor and graduation-year academics who in reality overlapped 
with a rotator similar to the academics who landed a job in a department without a rotator. 
Equivalently, we treat the same advisor and graduation year academics who did not overlap 
with a rotator in reality as if they did. For both exercises, if the mechanism is tied to the 
rotator, then the Treatment variables should be statistically insignificant because there is no 
overlap with the rotator in reality. Indeed, as shown in Online Appendix Table 3, the 
Treatment variables are statistically insignificant.  
 
Online Appendix Table 3. Placebo test: false rotator appointments. 
 
Random timing of 
rotator’s return to the 
department 
Random appointment of 
rotator department 
   
RotatorDepartment t-5 -0.022 -0.002 
 (0.018) (0.025) 
RotatorDepartment t-4 0.016 0.292 
 (0.031) (0.265) 
RotatorDepartment t-3 0.020 -0.071** 
 (0.035) (0.032) 
RotatorDepartment t-2 -0.013 0.062 
 (0.020) (0.064) 
RotatorDepartment t-1 -0.001 0.024 
 (0.022) (0.033) 
Treatment 0 0.027 -0.023 
 (0.027) (0.029) 
Treatment 1 0.007 -0.031 
 (0.026) (0.039) 
Treatment 2 -0.006 -0.013 
 (0.023) (0.026) 
Treatment 3 0.039 -0.013 
 (0.031) (0.020) 
Treatment 4 0.032 -0.007 
 (0.030) (0.014) 
Treatment 5 -0.042** 0.001 
 (0.020) (0.021) 
PostDoc -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Assistant Professor 0.021 0.033*** 
 (0.017) (0.011) 
Associate Professor 0.012 0.016 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Male -0.001 0.012 
 (0.011) (0.008) 
H-index -0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
External Funding ($M) 0.360 0.388** 
 (0.184) (0.183) 
Previous NSF ($M) 0.113*** 0.099*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) 
Ranking -0.007** -0.007** 
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 (0.003) (0.003) 
Faculty NSF ($M) 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.039 0.035 
 (0.021) (0.022) 
   
Science field FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Observations 2,152 2,642 
R2 0.170 0.176 
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.141 
Number of Departments 65 158 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the department level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
